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CONTRACTS- ASSIGNABILITY OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE 
 
Summary 
 
 Philip A. Burkhardt and his employer, Traffic Control Services (Traffic Control) 
appealed the issuance of a preliminary injunction enforcing a noncompetiton covenant in 
favor of United Rentals (United), the purchaser of the corporate assets of NES Trench 
Shoring (NES), Burkhardt’s former employer. The main issue on appeal was Burkhardt’s 
contention that the covenant not to compete he made with NES could not be assigned 
during a corporate sale absent some consideration. 
 Burkhardt, Traffic Control, United, and NES all specialize in renting and selling 
trench shoring equipment to underground construction contractors in the greater Las 
Vegas area. During 1999 and 2000 Burkhardt worked for United as a sales representative. 
Late in 2000, Burkhardt became dissatisfied with United’s customer service policies and 
left United for a position at NES. 
 As a condition of his employment with NES, Burkhardt signed noncompetiton 
and nondisclosure covenants, for doing so Burkhardt received $10,000. Burkhardt alleged 
that before he took the job with NES the management assured him that they had no plans 
to sell or be bought out by United. 
 During his tenure at NES, Burkhardt was promoted from sales representative to 
branch/sales manager where he gained access to NES’s confidential business records 
including customer and price lists and pricing strategies. Burkhardt’s duties led him to 
become intimately familiar with NES’s customer base. 
 In June of 2002, United and NES reached an agreement where United would 
purchase NES’s corporate assets for three times fair market value. The purchase 
agreement was limited to certain assets with language stating “[a]ll contracts and 
agreements that are not listed as ‘Assumed Contracts’ are ‘Excluded Assets.’” While the 
agreement listed other noncompetiton covenants, Burkhardt’s was not among them. 
 A week before the conclusion of the sale, United requested that a significant 
number of key employees sign new one-year contracts which included new nondisclosure 
covenants. Of the eighty-one key employees, nine refused to sign. This group included 
Burkhardt. However, Burkhardt remained with United/NES as a sales manager through 
the transition; but again, he quickly became disenfranchised with United’s customer 
service policies. 
 In August of 2002, Burkhardt began negotiating with Traffic Control, United’s 
direct competitor. Burkhardt did inform Traffic Control about his 
nondisclosure/noncompetiton covenant that he believed was null and void since he was 
terminating his employment with United, not NES with whom he made the initial 
agreement. 
 Burkhardt began work at Traffic Control on August 10, 2002 at which time he 
began contacting companies to solicit business on behalf of Traffic Control. United, 
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through counsel, sent Burkhardt written notification that his employment with NES 
constituted a breach of his noncompetiton covenant.  
When Burkhardt did not cease working for NES, United filed a complaint stating 
that Burkhardt was using NES/United’s confidential information to solicit customers for 
Traffic Control. Ultimately, the district court entered a preliminary injunction enforcing 
the NES noncompetiton agreement for a period of one year. The district court concluded 
that Burkhardt’s covenant was reasonable in time and scope, assignable as an asset of 
value, and that NES validly assigned the covenant to United in the asset sale. 
On appeal, Burkhardt argued that absent some independent consideration on his 
behalf, his covenant should not have been assignable during the sale. Burkhardt 
contended that the agreement was between him and NES and allowing United to assume 
the covenant would breach his contractual rights. The Nevada Supreme Court agreed 
with Burkhardt, holding that the agreement was personal to Burkhardt and he only 
intended to be bound to NES when he signed the covenant. However, the court did hold 
that one of the main problems with the assignability of the covenant was the lack of a 
clause in the purchase agreement permitting the assignment to a third party. 
 
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
 May an employer in a corporate sale assign the rights under an employee’s 
noncompetiton/nondisclosure covenant without the employee’s consent? 
 
Disposition 
 
 No. An employer may only assign such covenants during a corporate sale with the 
employee’s consent and only when the consent is supported by independent 
consideration. 
 
Commentary 
 
State of the Law Before Traffic Control 
 
 This issue was one of first impression in the state of Nevada. While 
noncompetiton covenants have existed in Nevada jurisprudence for over twenty years2 
the assignability of them had never been at direct issue before the Nevada Supreme 
Court. Beyond caselaw, NRS 613.200, which governs the requirements for 
noncompetiton covenants,3 was the only statute that guided the enforceability of 
transferred covenants.  
                                                 
2 Ellis v. McDaniel, 95 Nev. 455, 459, 596 P.2d 222, 224 (1979) (“[B]ecause the loss of a person’s 
livelihood is a very serious matter, post employment anti-competitive covenants are scrutinized with 
greater care than are similar covenants incident to the sale of a business.”) 
3 NRS 613.200(4) (2004) permits employers and employees to negotiate and execute enforceable 
noncompetiton covenants if they are supported by valuable consideration and are reasonable in scope and 
duration. 
 However, other jurisdictions have examined the assignability of noncompetiton 
covenants and have reached mixed results. The majority of the older case law and 
treatises follow the rule that a noncompetiton covenant can be assigned at any time with 
or without employee approval.4 For example, in Premier Laundry v. Klein,5 the court 
held that an assigned noncompetiton covenant is “a valuable right which the courts will 
enforce.” 
 Recent trends in caselaw have been away from the assignability of the 
noncompetiton covenants to place more rights in the hands of employees6 especially in 
the absence of assignability clauses in the sales contract.7 The Nevada Supreme Court 
latched onto these newer views of the covenant assignability, focusing on the fact that: 1) 
the assignability clause was absent to Burkhardt’s covenant, 2) the sales contract 
contained language that expressly reserved things not named in the sales contract as 
‘Excluded Assets’ and 3) Burkhardt, based on his testimony about his previous 
disagreements with United, would have never agreed to a noncompetiton agreement with 
them.  
 
Effect of Traffic Control on Current Law  
 
 By limiting the unfettered assignability of noncompetiton covenants the Nevada 
Supreme Court has followed the trend that Nevada lawmakers started when they passed 
NRS 613.200.8 The court also recognized that the allowing the arbitrary transfer of 
covenant absent some enumerated compensation would be forcing the effected employee 
to suffer the same restriction—limiting his ability to compete in the free market—for a 
party who was a total stranger to the original agreement. 
 However, the court does not wholly prohibit the transfer of noncompetiton 
covenants. They created a caveat permitting the transfer of the covenants if they are 
renegotiated, providing the effected party with independent consideration. Essentially, 
this is nothing more than a renegotiation of the covenant. This ensures a measure of 
fairness between all parties. 
                                                 
4 See J.H. Renarde, Inc. v. Sims, 711 A.2d 410, 412-14 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998) (as a matter of law, 
noncompetiton covenants may be freely assigned in an asset sale like any other contractual right in the 
absence of some express contractual prohibition); Equifax Services, Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th 
Cir. 1990); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 cmt. D, illus. 6 (1981)  
B sells his business his business to A and makes a valid contract not to compete. A sells 
the business to C and assigns to C the right to have B refrain from competition. The 
assignment is effective with the respect to competition with the business derived from B. 
The good will of the business, with contractual protection against its impairment is 
treated as an assignable asset. 
5 73 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (N.Y. Spec. term 1947). 
6 See Hess v.Gebhard & Co. Inc., 808 A.2d 912, 917 (Pa. 2002) (denying the assignability of a 
noncompetiton covenant without an employee’s consent), Corporate Exp. Office Products v. Phillips, 847 
So. 2d 406, 413 (Fla. 2003) (“Thus, when the sale of the assets includes a personal service contract that 
contains a noncompete agreement, the purchaser can enforce its terms only with the employee’s consent to 
assignment.”).  
7 Securitas Security Services USA , Inc. v. Jenkins, 16 Mass L. Rptr. 486 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003) available 
at 2003 WLW 21781385 at *5 (covenant did not contain assignment clause; employee did not covenant 
with successor company not to compete with it) 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. 614.200 (2004) (ensuring that noncompetiton covenants meet basic requirements that 
protect the rights of the individual). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 After Traffic Control, any corporate entity that chooses to engage in a corporate 
buyout or sale must proceed with caution. By prohibiting the unrestricted assignability of 
noncompetiton covenants unless they are supported by new independent consideration, 
the Nevada Supreme Court protected the rights of workers at the expense of large 
businesses. From this point on, the costs of a buyout or sale may increase well beyond the 
simple assets. Now companies must include the price of renegotiating all of the 
employees’ restrictive covenants into the overall price of the corporate sale. 
 However, there may be one avenue that this decision could be challenged. An 
enterprising attorney could argue that the true issue here was not the assignability of 
covenants, but rather the lack in this instance of an express clause permitting assignment. 
In fact, this was one the main supporting reasons pointed to by the court. The court cited 
to All Star Bonding v. State of Nevada,9 for the idea that the court could not “interpolate 
in a contract what the contract does not contain.” But this argument is weak at best due to 
the strong language of the court emphasizing the need for the arms-length renegotiation 
of the covenants for independent consideration. 
                                                 
9 62 P.3d 1124, 1125 (2003). 
